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Abstract 
In this paper I present and discuss views expressed by Finnish energy policy actors on 
wind power policy options in Finland. Views were collected with a questionnaire and 
interviews. The views reflect criteria for good regulation and are analysed through 
criteria drawn from regulation theory literature. The arguments contain many elements 
from the regulation criteria, as well as political and value-based criteria. Increasing wind 
power’s competitiveness is a paramount objective of policy, but there is no uniform 
view of the way to reach it. Emphasis on free competition is strong, setting boundaries 
to methods that are considered appropriate for promoting wind power. Information 
guidance instruments were not considered very effective, but nevertheless fairly 
probable and quite preferable, particularly consumer information. Financial incentives 
were considered very probable and rather preferable. They were deemed necessary for 
the competitiveness of wind power, but should be phased out (except R&D support). 
Unpredictability of support was found problematic. Command-and-control mechanisms 
were considered rather improbable, and the views about their preferability were sharply 
divided. They were criticised for not being suitable for liberalised electricity markets, 
and for having limited impact on innovation. 
  
Keywords: Wind power; energy policy; regulation criteria 
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Wind Power Policy Options in Finland: Analysis of Energy 
Policy Actors’ Views Using Regulation Theory 
Vilja Varho 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Wind power is one of the renewable energy forms that have received a lot of attention 
worldwide in recent years. Wind power is being promoted mainly because it is non-
polluting and lowers the overall emissions of the energy sector by offsetting other forms 
of energy production1. As it is currently more expensive than the so-called conventional 
energy forms, there are commonly some sorts of policy measures or incentives to make 
it more attractive to investors. These policy instruments differ greatly from country to 
country.  
 
Current wind power policy in Finland consists mainly of an investment subsidy 
(approximately 30 % of investment costs), and refund of the electricity tax. Recently 
this latter form of support was detached from the tax rate and is simply a subsidy paid 
per produced kilowatt-hour (kWh) of wind electricity. Other support mechanisms 
include research and development funding, and information guidance. 
 
In Finland wind power is still a marginal electricity production form, about 50 MW of 
installed capacity providing some 86 gigawatt-hours (GWh) in 2003, or only 0.1 % of 
the electricity consumption (Laakso, 2004). Nevertheless, there is substantial technical 
potential, especially if off-shore plants become feasible (according to one estimate, the 
technological potential of wind on the Finnish coastline and Lapland is some 10 TWh/a, 
and the offshore potential some 50 TWh/a (Kara et al., 1999)).  
 
In addition, the attitude towards wind power is rather positive in Finland, which has 
manifested itself in the nationally set target of 500 megawatts (MW) of installed 
capacity by 2010 (1 TWh/a) (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1999). This would mean a 
tenfold increase from the current capacity. As the growth of wind power has been quite 
slow in recent years, only some 15 MW since 1998 (see Figure 1), there has been 
discussion whether new policy instruments should be set up. Also the ongoing process 
of opening European electricity markets has pushed towards some sort of harmonization 
in the policies of different countries.  
 
                                                 
1
 Naturally wind power also has emissions during the lifetime of the turbines, but during the operation of 
the turbine only noise is emitted.  
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Figure 1. The Finnish wind power capacity from 1991 to 2003. Source: Laakso (2004). 
 
Much of the scientific discussion on energy policy choices is based on statistics, legal 
aspects, economics, etc. Rarely are the views of the people who participate in the policy 
making decisions heard, in particular people who are not part of the government. Their 
opinions, however, have a crucial impact on what kind of policies are chosen, and the 
analysis of their views may also offer new thoughts, needs for research, and even a 
“reality check” for scientists.  
 
The rather unique approach and the rich interview material used in this paper are aimed 
at delivering such benefits, as well as at systematising and clarifying the discussion on 
wind energy policy instruments, also for the benefit of the policy makers themselves. 
The aim of this study is to analyse the views of wind power policy actors on different 
policy options, using regulation criteria from regulation theory. The material consists of 
25 interviews as well as a questionnaire given to the interviewees.  
 
I will first describe the material and methods used (section 2), then discuss briefly 
regulation criteria, such as effectiveness and flexibility, based on the regulation theory 
literature (section 3), then present results from my empirical research (section 4), and 
discuss the results in section 5, concluding with a brief summary of findings in 
section 6. 
 
 
2. Material and methods 
 
The analysis is based on two types of material. These are interviews and a 
questionnaire, which the respondents filled in before the interviews. I collected the 
material mainly in the spring and summer of 2002, as a part of a research project on 
wind power policy in Finland. An additional interview was conducted in 2003 and two 
more in 2004 (using the same questionnaire). The interviewees were chosen to represent 
all the relevant fields of political and economic decision makers in the wind power 
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sector; policy making and implementation, business community, lobbying groups, and 
research sector. The interviews lasted approximately 1.5 hours each. The list of 
interviewees is given in Appendix 1.  
 
The interviewees were chosen from different organisations, but in this study they only 
represented themselves as individuals. The interviews were confidential, which made 
them more open, and allowed the respondents to give their honest opinions instead of 
the political statements of their organisations. For this reason the statements have not 
been identified as having been said by any one individual. All quotes were translated 
into English by me. 
 
Only two of the 25 respondents were female, and this gender bias seems to reflect the 
reality of the wind power sector (and energy sector in general) in Finland, which 
consists largely of men. In discussing the views of the respondents, they will all be 
referred to as “he” to preserve their anonymity. Most (18 out of 25) have a degree in 
technological or natural scientific fields. In fact, only one had not graduated from a 
university. While it is clear that the interviewees do not represent Finns in general, I 
believe the group to be representative of the sectors influencing Finnish wind power.  
 
The interviews were semi-structured, meaning that questions were not identical in each 
interview, although the themes remained the same. This method allowed for additional 
questions and more freedom for the interviewees to express their interests and views. A 
number of topics were covered, such as the future of wind power capacity in Finland, 
the role of consumers in promoting wind power, and different actors’ influence on the 
growth of the sector and on the formulation of wind power policy in Finland. These are 
discussed in forthcoming articles and in Varho and Tapio (2004). The analysis 
presented in this article is based on the discussion on the likely development and 
desirability of policy instruments. 
 
The part of the questionnaire used in this analysis is presented as Table 1. As can be 
seen, it included many different types of policy instruments, representing information 
guidance, financial incentives and administrative or “command-and-control” type 
measures. The currently existing Finnish policy instruments were included, as well as 
some examples of policies used in other countries, and also new ideas were introduced 
and asked for. 
 
The questionnaire had also questions about, for example, wind power capacity, 
electricity consumption, distribution of political power among energy policy actors, and 
different aspects of the development of the wind electricity market in Finland. Through 
these questions the respondents created two views about the future, a probable and a 
preferable one. Some of the answers were used for the scenarios presented in Varho and 
Tapio (2004), others will be analysed in subsequent papers.  
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Table 1. Question 12 in the questionnaire (translated from the original Finnish version). 
    
 
12. In Finland there have so far been at least the following wind power policy instruments in use: investment 
subsidies, tax refunds, funding of technology programs and production of information for those who are  
interested in wind power. 
 
Which of the following instruments will be used in promoting wind power in Finland? Please use  scales 1-5  
in your answers: 
 
Probable future        Preferable future 
1=very improbable       1=very undesirable  
2=rather improbable       2=rather undesirable 
3=probability 50 %       3=indifferent 
4=rather probable       4=rather desirable 
5=very probable        5=very desirable 
 
 
Probable future Preferable future 
2010 2025 2010 2025 
Investment subsidy  
Tax subsidy (e.g. refund of energy tax)  
Research, development and demonstration funding   
Advice about wind power to energy companies   
Information campaigns on wind power to consumers   
A wind electricity quota set for electricity suppliers  
Guaranteed price for wind electricity  
Government label on ”green electricity” (as in the 
organic foods label)  
 
A duty to build wind power set to governmental energy 
companies 
 
Something else?  
 
 
 
21 of the 25 interviewees filled in the questionnaire, but some did not answer every 
question. For example, one respondent did not supply answers for the year 2025, 
considering it to be too far in the future to make any estimates.  
 
The graphic presentations about some results from the questionnaire can be found in 
section 4. These are helpful in illustrating the views to be found among the 
interviewees, but they tell little about the reasons behind the numbers. The interviews 
provide answers on that. I searched the transcripts for any references to certain policy 
instruments, as well as for more general views about good wind power policy. Then I 
analysed the results to see which regulation criteria (for examples of these, see 
“Regulation criteria”, section 3) the respondents had used in connection to which 
instruments, and how they valued these criteria. Section 4 contains a more descriptive 
account of the views, and the discussion of the results is presented in section 5.  
 
When looking at the graphs and other results from the questionnaire in the “Results” 
section, it is important to remember that they are not statistically representative. I 
believe that they do represent the prevalent views rather well, but the small sample size 
should be remembered. 
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Also, the question 12 used in this analysis was part of a questionnaire, where the 
respondents created through a series of questions two views about the future, a probable 
and a preferable one. Both had to be possible, according to the respondent. Therefore a 
value given in the questionnaire does not only reflect how preferable a policy 
instrument is, but also whether it is in the realm of possibilities. A respondent might 
consider a particular policy instrument preferable, but if he thought that it would not be 
possible to take it into use in Finland, for whatever reason, he might not mark it 
preferable.  
 
Similarly, sometimes the number does not only reflect the probability or desirability of 
using an instrument, but also its volume. For example, one respondent considered 
research funding very important and probable, but suspected that probably the available 
funds would be smaller than hoped for, and therefore only gave a 3 for the probability.  
 
Some respondents considered the instruments one at the time, so that many instruments 
could get high values simultaneously, others gave their answers considering the fact that 
all alternatives cannot be used at the same time. Even given these reservations, the 
graphs correspond well with the answers given in the interviews, and should be seen as 
indicative and illustrative representations of existing views.  
 
When it comes to interviews, it must be noted that people were more likely to discuss in 
length and detail such instruments which they objected to. Therefore the material has 
some overemphasis of negative arguments. 
 
 
3. Regulation criteria in the literature 
 
Criteria for good regulation have been discussed in regulation theory. This theory owes 
much to the public-choice literature and economics, but is essentially a part of legal 
theory. One aspect of this field is the discovery and discussion of criteria for good 
regulation. Since all such criteria (e.g., predictability, explicitness, and flexibility) can 
rarely be met at once, the aim is not to find perfect, optimal regulations, but to consider 
their merits and drawbacks from different points of view.  
 
Several criteria have been named in different articles and books. An exhaustive list 
cannot be compiled but the following list contains the most common criteria, in 
particular for environmental policy discussion. The following list is based mainly on a 
discussion by Määttä and Pulliainen (2003). 
 
Perhaps the most obvious criterion for regulation is effectiveness. There is no point in 
having a regulation unless it creates an impact. It is important to distinguish 
effectiveness, which refers to achieving the intended targets, from having an effect, 
which refers to also unintentional impacts (Similä, 2002). Both are, naturally, important 
in considering the suitability of an instrument.  
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A method’s effectiveness is not necessarily enough: also efficiency is important. 
Efficiency can be divided into several sub-categories. The first of these, sometimes 
thought to be the only one, is cost-effectiveness. This criterion is rather self-evident, as 
it certainly makes sense to try to achieve the maximum result with minimum resources. 
Certain researchers have, however, emphasised the difference between cost-
effectiveness, which is often a static issue, and dynamic efficiency. When judging the 
efficiency of an instrument, it must be considered what is the time frame of the analysis. 
A method may be efficient at a given time, but dynamic efficiency takes into account 
the method’s ability to foster innovation, so that in the future the task may be 
undertaken even more efficiently. “So called ‘technology forcing’ policy aims at 
guiding technological development in such a way that what is not possible today would 
be possible in the future” (Similä, 2002, p.190, translation Varho). Dynamic efficiency 
is therefore also connected to effectiveness: new technologies may enable the setting of 
stricter targets and the reaching of better results. Driesen (2003) discusses static and 
dynamic efficiency at length, paying particular attention to the differences of market-
based instruments and “command-and-control” type instruments2. 
 
In energy policy discussions this theme emerges in the context of (technological) 
learning, sometimes in slightly different terms. Dynamic efficiency in wind power 
would mean, for example, having policies that foster or force innovation to more 
efficient (i.e. less expensive) wind electricity production. There are different ways 
through which cost reduction can take place, however, not all of which are about 
technological change. I will return to this issue in more detail in Discussion (section 5).  
 
The third sub-category of efficiency is administrative efficiency, referring to low 
administrative and transaction costs, both for the government and for the participating 
companies.  
 
Another important area of criteria is flexibility. This has also been divided into three 
sub-categories by Määttä and Pulliainen (2003): external flexibility measures how 
automatically the regulation adapts to changing conditions (such as changing the 
number of players in the market or technological development), technological 
flexibility refers to the freedom of choice the players have in choosing through which 
methods to comply with the regulation, and normative flexibility measures how easy it 
is to modify regulation, for example, when targets are changed. Normative flexibility is 
problematic in terms of predictability and stability: if it is very easy to change 
regulations, they cannot be relied upon.  
 
There are also other, perhaps less obvious criteria that can be given to regulations: for 
example, justness of a measure can refer to burden sharing, i.e. how the costs are 
divided within the society. Level of democracy in decision making has been 
associated with the discussion on whether a regulation moves power to administration 
from elected bodies, for example, to a Ministry from the Parliament. This criterion has 
emerged in particular with environmental law. Market-based instruments have been 
                                                 
2
 There is no exact definition for “command-and-control” instruments, and they are sometimes called 
administrative instruments or legal regulation. All of these names emphasise the regulators’ significant 
role and power. 
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considered more democratic in this respect than command-and-control type systems that 
tend to rely on case by case considerations within the administration. On the other hand, 
in public planning it is possible to hear different interest groups that the market forces 
ignore (Similä, 2002).  
 
In this study a number of other criteria emerged. In the following section I will present 
the arguments on different policy instrument options in a fairly descriptive manner, and 
will return to the criteria later in the paper (Discussion).  
 
 
4. Results 
 
In this section I will present the results of the questionnaire and interviews. First, there 
will be some general findings, then, the results instrument by instrument. Using rather 
traditional way in regulation literature these have been grouped into three groups: 
information guidance, financial incentives, and administrative or command-and-control 
type instruments. The grouping is somewhat arbitrary, as will be discussed below, since 
policy instruments may have features from at least two of these classes. Nevertheless, it 
aids in seeing the differences between the policies. In the end of this section I will also 
introduce briefly some policy mechanisms that were mentioned by the respondents but 
were not included in the questionnaire.  
 
4.1. General findings 
 
The scale used in the questionnaire is a set of qualitative classes, which strictly speaking 
cannot be added together. Nevertheless, I believe that some general interpretations can 
be made using the average values given to each instrument. These results are only 
indicative, but they illustrate two trends that could also be identified in the interviews.  
 
A clear trend in the numerical answers is that the average value of preferability for each 
policy instrument is smaller for 2025 than for 2010. This mainly reflects the assumption 
that wind power would be (at least more) competitive in the electricity market, and 
would not require (as much) support from the state any more in 2025.  
 
Another finding is that the only two instruments that had higher value for probability 
than for desirability, for both 2010 and 2025, were the investment subsidy and the tax 
refund, i.e. the main instruments currently in use. It seems that while there was a general 
belief that these instruments would still be in use at least in 2010, there was a wish to 
change the system in some way. 
 
4.2. Information guidance 
 
There were three policy instruments representing information guidance in the 
questionnaire, two of which are grouped together here. First, there is advice and 
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information provided to wind electricity producers, and second (and third), there is 
information directed at consumers. The latter is in the form of campaigns directed at 
consumers, and governmental labelling of the so-called “green” electricity (i.e. 
electricity having lower environmental impact, from renewable energy sources). 
 
Often information guidance, and production and distribution of information in general, 
were viewed as very neutral, non-political activity by the respondents. This probably 
increases the preferability of information guidance, especially among those who do not 
wish to see the state affect the liberalised market. In addition, information guidance is 
normally compatible with all other policy instruments, advocates of different policies 
can recommend information guidance as well.  
 
4.2.1. Advice to energy companies 
 
As wind power is a new, decentralised source of electricity, there have been doubts 
whether energy companies really know how to enter the wind electricity market. There 
were, in fact, several references to this kind of problem, although some of them referred 
more to the corporate cultures than the level of knowledge. Big companies were 
expected to be more familiar with big, centralised plants, and even though wind power 
could be run also by new small companies, these might lack the necessary expertise to 
function in the electricity market3. There has already been an attempt to solve this 
problem in Finland, as there has been at least one guidebook for wind power projects, 
published by the government-owned Motiva which promotes renewable energy sources 
and efficient energy use (Motiva, 1999).  
 
As can be seen in Figures 2 and 3, the views on this type of advice were extremely 
varied, and were distributed particularly evenly for 2025. There were not many direct 
references to this policy instrument in the interviews and opinions were not expressed 
very sharply, although one respondent believed that it is a very inefficient way of trying 
to change anything. 
 
                                                 
3
 The liberalised electricity market and exchange, combined with carbon emission trading, and possibly 
with green certificate trading, was already seen to demand a great deal of expertise from electricity 
companies.  
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Figure 2. Probability and preferability of wind power related advice to energy companies in 
2010, according to the respondents. 
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Figure 3. Probability and preferability of wind power related advice to energy companies in 
2025, according to the respondents. 
 
A few respondents expressed their opinion that companies already know or should 
know themselves what to do. One interviewee believed that such information could be 
distributed to only a limited degree from the outside, and that experience and learning-
by-doing were more significant. Nobody seemed to believe that this policy measure was 
particularly important, but many had the opinion that it was nevertheless good to have 
in the palette.  
 
Here emerged the first criteria that were not mentioned in section 3 (although it can be 
said that they are sub-categories to effectiveness). Significance refers to the importance 
of the immediate objective of the policy for the overall problem. For example, if the 
overall target is to increase the number of wind power plants in Finland, what is the 
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barrier? This has to be identified before a policy instrument can be chosen. Is the 
problem that is being solved with a regulation a significant one? Another criterion is 
relevance. Is the proposed policy instrument really relevant for solving the problem? As 
discussed, some interviewees did consider the energy companies lack of expertise with 
wind power to be a significant problem, but there were doubts whether advice given to 
them would really solve the problem.  
 
In summary, it can be seen that the criteria associated with advice to companies were 
divided views about the significance of the problem, and assumed limited relevance 
and low cost-effectiveness of the instrument.  
 
4.2.2. Consumer information 
 
In the questionnaire consumer information was expressed through two policy 
instruments, namely information campaigns on wind power to consumers, and 
government labelling of “green” electricity. The aspect of consumer information will be 
discussed in more detail in another paper by Salmela and Varho, see also Salmela 
(2004). In short, it can be said that the views on consumers’ role to promote wind 
electricity were very polarized. Some interviewees believed that only consumer demand 
could bring significant growth to wind sector, as  
 
“the most important factor here are the consumers, for if there is no demand, 
then, you cannot sell by force, somebody has to buy”.  
 
Others argued that as the increase of practically emission-free and renewable energy 
source benefits the whole society, the responsibility of change should not be left to 
individual households. Rather, the state should ensure that the benefits that are shared 
by all are also paid for by all.  
 
This polarization could be interpreted as resulting from two different functions of the 
green electricity market: it can be seen as a market place, or as a tool for environmental 
improvement. If it is the former, consumer choice is paramount, if it is the latter, 
increase of wind power (through various means) is most important.  
 
Finnish consumers were generally not expected to start buying green electricity in large 
quantities. The main reasons for this were considered to be the lack of environmental 
consciousness and the higher costs of wind electricity4. As can be seen in Figure 4, 
consumer campaigns were rather popular among the respondents. The main reason for 
this was the importance of consumer demand for the development of the sector.  
 
The following reasons were named for giving lower values (undesirable or indifferent):  
people should already know enough about wind power and environmental issues to act;  
                                                 
4
 Other studies have indicated that there are other problems as well, in particular the consumers’ lack of 
experience of acting in the liberalised market, and their lack of trust towards green electricity products 
and energy companies (Salmela, 2004). There were some references to this type of unfamiliarity also in 
the interviews. 
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it should be left to energy companies to advertise their products, and the government 
should not interfere. There was also a view that it would not be possible for the state to 
promote one form of energy over others, as that would count as market distortion; 
such campaigns have very low cost-effectiveness. They would require professional 
marketing style, and best efficiency could be achieved when targeting larger consumers 
rather than households; 
one respondent (who did not answer to this part of the questionnaire) had doubts 
whether wind power even is an environmentally good choice, considering the whole life 
cycle of turbines.  
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Figure 4. Probability and preferability of information campaigns on wind power to consumers 
in 2010, according to the respondents. 
 
Despite the fairly high probability and high preferability of the use of this instrument, 
there was not very much enthusiasm about it in the interviews. Even when it was 
considered important that consumers would become active in the green electricity 
market, there was fairly little faith in their doing so. There were doubts about the 
effectiveness of campaigns, and real change in attitudes was thought to take long, even 
generations. Despite all of this, consumer information was hoped to legitimise the use of 
policy instruments and create overall understanding of wind power and its impacts.  
 
In summary, the cost-effectiveness and effectiveness of this instrument were 
considered low, and there was disagreement about the significance of the problem of 
low consumer participation to the overall goal of increased wind power production. This 
was related to the acceptability of the instrument: is the use of the instrument 
congruent with the existing legislation and would the use of the instrument signify 
unacceptable interference with the market. Consumer information was thought to be 
a very acceptable method in general, but there were some doubts about the specific tool 
suggested.  
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Another aspect of this consumer information is the labelling of green electricity 
products. For many years it has been up to the energy companies and/or environmental 
organisations like the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation to distinguish 
between environmentally more benign forms of electricity production. More official, 
governmental labels were suggested in the questionnaire.  
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Figure 5. Probability and preferability of governmental green electricity labelling in 2010, 
according to the respondents. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 5, there was a high degree of uncertainty about this instrument. 
This is interesting, as there was already the European Union directive requiring that  
 
“Member States shall, not later than 27 October 2003, ensure that the origin of 
electricity produced from renewable energy sources can be guaranteed as such 
within the meaning of this Directive according to objective, transparent and 
nondiscriminatory criteria laid down by each Member State. They shall ensure that 
a guarantee of origin is issued to this effect in response to a request.”( Directive 
2001/77/EC, article 5).  
 
In the interviews it was usually considered preferable that different sources of electricity 
were somehow differentiated, but the particular method of labelling was not so 
uniformly approved of. Some argued that it is illogical to differentiate only green 
electricity, and to prove that it is somehow better for the environment. Instead, all (and 
in particular the less environmentally sound) sources of electricity and their impacts 
should be made known to consumers.  
 
This is, in fact, now being done, as electricity sources are differentiated in electricity 
bills (see Directive 2003/54/EC). Some people did not consider this type of information 
governmental labelling, however, but rather something that the energy companies would 
do, even though it was required by law.  
 
This type of information guidance was believed to cost little, and to clarify the existing 
situation of different green electricity criteria, which the consumers may find confusing. 
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However, the same doubts about the effectiveness of this kind of consumer information 
were present as with campaigns; Finns were not thought to be willing to pay more for 
green electricity, at least in the short run (up to 2010 or so). What impact the new 
sources of information will have on the market remains to be seen. 
 
The main criteria that emerged here were effectiveness, which was considered low, 
combined, however, with the fairly good cost-effectiveness, made possible by the low 
costs of the method.  
 
4.3. Financial incentives 
 
In general, financial incentives in some form were usually considered necessary for the 
development of wind power in Finland, but it was also emphasised that they should be 
transitory in nature. These incentives should be lowered and finally removed, as wind 
power becomes more competitive in the market. There was disagreement over whether 
competitiveness on market terms could be reached by 2025.  
 
In the literature on environmental regulation there is often a distinction between market-
based regulation and command-and-control type regulation. In wind power policy the 
difference is perhaps not quite so clear, as all instruments operate within the electricity 
market, and even the command-and-control -type regulations rely on market activities. 
However, there is a difference between financial incentives, which ultimately depend on 
market actors’ willingness to respond to them, and commands that force markets to 
operate in a certain way. The latter may still rely on competition and market 
mechanisms, but to a lesser degree. A prime example of this type of regulation is the 
wind electricity quota for electricity suppliers, as the suppliers can choose where they 
purchase the wind electricity from. The wind electricity producers are then competing 
against one another, but they do not compete against producers using other sources of 
energy. 
 
Research funding is slightly difficult to place in this division to three types of 
regulations. It is clearly related to information guidance. It differs from the policies 
discussed in the previous section in that it is directed more towards wind turbine 
manufacture than towards wind electricity market. However, in this way it also differs 
from the other financial instruments discussed here.  
 
The main reason that research, development and demonstration (RD&D) funding is 
included here among the financial incentives is that it can constitute a fairly significant 
financial benefit to companies that produce wind turbines or their components. In 
addition, research and development funding and the investment subsidy are to some 
extent both directed at improving technology. They are two instruments that have a 
common goal. Wind power in Finland is strongly tied to the Finnish wind turbine 
industry. Even though wind power policy aims at the increase of wind electricity 
production in Finland, the motive of supporting the turbine industry is not insignificant. 
Both the R&D funding and investment subsidy have been geared towards technological 
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development. This close tie makes it more sensible to discuss these instruments 
together, despite the difference in their nature.  
 
4.3.1. RD&D Funding 
 
In general the respondents were very much in favour of research, development and 
demonstration (RD&D) funding, as can be seen in Figure 6. This policy received the 
highest average value in terms of preferability, both for 2010 (4.68) and 2025 (4.12).  
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Figure 6. Probability and preferability of RD&D funding in 2010, according to the respondents.  
 
There were several reasons for favouring this instrument. First of all, one of the main 
goals of wind power policy is to reduce the costs of wind power production. Many 
interviewees believed that this cost reduction would follow from technological 
innovation. Also the wish to support Finnish wind turbine industry contributed to the 
desirability.  
 
One respondent also argued that this type of policy is most sustainable: when 
technologies are not yet mature enough, they may collapse when subsidies are removed. 
As he did not consider wind power to be very mature yet, he believed that it is most 
prudent to support mainly the technological development and not to create artificial 
market growth through state funds. 
 
There was some disagreement over whether wind power is technologically mature or 
not. Some argued that the technology is mature enough and now the policy efforts 
should be spent on market pull (influencing the demand side of the market). One 
respondent accused policy makers of hiding behind a call for more research, when 
measures to make use of the technology are needed. The slow market growth in Finland 
was also seen as proof that the technology push of Finnish policy (influencing the 
supply side) is not an adequate approach.  
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Some views expressed, however, were of the opposite opinion. One interviewee argued 
that it is necessary to continue researching even more basic things, as the leap to the 
megawatt-class turbines poses problems to the existing solutions and technology. Fast 
global market growth does not mean that there are no technological problems to solve, 
as the product keeps changing rapidly.  
 
In any case, it was expected that the technology would improve over time, and the need 
for further state funds for R&D would diminish. Nevertheless, this type of state funded 
research was considered valuable even in 2025. There seemed to be a rather common 
belief in the intrinsic value of increased knowledge and expertise, and it was considered 
acceptable for the state to take part in the funding of this increase. The state was, in 
particular, expected to fund long-term basic research that may not have direct 
commercial applications.  
 
The fact that almost all respondents have university degrees may of course have 
influenced their positive attitude towards knowledge and research, but I believe that 
there is a fairly strong agreement about their importance in Finland in general. 
 
However, even some interviewees who advocated R&D funding had some reservations 
about the appropriate amount. In particular, it was pointed out that the Finnish funds are 
only a small part of the global R&D expenditure on wind power, and Finns should 
consider carefully where to spend their limited resources: perhaps research on other 
sources of energy would be more cost-effective. Even if the Finnish turbine industry 
does have a significant share of the market (in 2001 the Finnish wind power 
components had a global market share of approximately 5 percent, (Holttinen et al., 
2002)), it was remarked that the real strength of Finnish renewable energy (technology) 
lies in the biomass.  
 
On the whole, the biggest disagreements seemed to be about the sufficient level of R&D 
funding, as well as about its relative importance within Finnish policy, not about the 
desirability of research funding as such. It is also notable that R&D funding can be used 
in conjunction with any other policy instrument, so advocates of any kind of policy can 
support this instrument.  
 
Here the most important criteria seem to be high significance and relevance (wind 
power production costs are too high and R&D brings them to more competitive level). 
However, there were a few strongly expressed arguments, emphasising the need to 
create markets, achieve economies of scale, and in general to make use of the 
technology rather than concentrate on perfecting it. These statements contested the 
relevance of R&D.  
 
Some considered the use of R&D as the most sustainable policy. The acceptability of 
the instrument was quite high. However, even some respondents who supported this 
instrument had doubts whether the limited available funds should be given to wind 
power technology or rather to biomass, for example. In fact, with practically all 
suggested instruments there emerged the question of sufficiency of funds. It is not only 
a question of what is the best strategy, but also whether there is enough money for it. In 
this respect the respondents seemed rather sympathetic to the state’s problems, and 
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advocated the phase-out of subsidies as well as new ways of finding more money, as 
will be discussed in the following sections.  
 
4.3.2. Investment subsidy 
 
Investment subsidy is, along with the tax refund, the main element of the Finnish wind 
power policy. Monies available for subsidy are decided yearly in the Parliament, when 
the state budget is approved. The sum is available to different energy investments. 
Applications for the subsidy are directed usually to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
which has the power to determine how large the subsidy will be (up to 40 % of the 
investment cost), or can deny it altogether. If the investment represents new technology, 
the percentage can be higher than with conventional technology. Wind power projects 
are normally all considered “new” technology (Anttonen, 2004). On average the subsidy 
has been approximately 30 % of the investment cost (Helynen et al., 2003). The 
investment subsidy stands for approximately half of the financial incentives, and the 
production subsidy for the other half, when the lifetime of turbines is assumed to be 20 
years (Mäki, 2004). 
 
Views about the investment subsidy were also rather polarized in the interviews. Its use 
was considered very probable, at least until 2010 (see Figure 7), but there were a 
number of critical opinions about its benefits, so that the preferability is less than 
probability (see Figure 8). In fact, investment subsidy and tax refund were the only 
instruments mentioned in the questionnaire that received smaller average values for 
preferable future than for probable future. 
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Figure 7. Probability of investment subsidy in 2010 and 2025, according to the respondents. 
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Figure 8. Probability and preferability of investment subsidy in 2010, according to the 
respondents.  
 
The main reason why the probability is so much lower in 2025 is that by then wind 
power is assumed to be competitive, or at least require much less subsidisation5. The 
very high probability for 2010 resulted from the assumption that there would be no 
rapid changes in wind power policy. As there are already certain policies in place, there 
is always a certain lag before new policies can be decided upon, the design detailed, and 
the new rules and bureaucracy set in place to replace the existing ones. Another 
delaying factor is that the energy policy sector is undergoing significant changes, for 
example, the electricity market liberalisation on European level, and the carbon 
emission trading within the European Union. It was thought that there was a wish to 
wait and see what impact these changes bring, before modifying the policies directed 
specifically at renewable energy forms. In fact, in 2004 a working group discussing the 
impacts of emission trading ended up recommending no changes to wind power policy 
(Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2004).  
 
A wish for more predictable wind power policy was both a reason to oppose and to 
support investment subsidy, but the apparent conflict lies mainly in the way investment 
subsidy is organised in Finland. Investment subsidy was thought to be safe from 
political and policy changes, as it is paid all at once. Other subsidies get paid over the 
years, and are therefore less predictable.  
 
On the other hand, the predictability of investment subsidy suffers from the fact that the 
money available for them is decided yearly in the state budget negotiations, so there is 
no certainty about the funds available for investment subsidy in future years. This 
makes it more difficult to plan the company strategy and investments for future years.  
 
                                                 
5
 Some respondents gave a lower value for policy instruments in 2025 than 2010, when they expected the 
amount or relative importance to decrease, although the probability or preferability of the use of the 
instrument might not change.  
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A few interviewees proposed the creation of some sort of fund for subsidies, for 
example, through collecting a small sum per kilowatt-hour from consumers. In addition 
to the issue of predictability, the idea of such funds or trusts is related to sufficiency. 
Even now it is not possible to give investment subsidy to very big projects. So far the 
wind power projects have been small, rarely more than 10 MW, and bigger projects 
would quickly consume all available funds. If the pace of construction increases, the 
need for funds would increase as well, even taking into account the possible cost 
reductions. If funds could be collected in advance and put into some kind of trust, there 
would be more money available for the future projects. This type of fund would work 
equally well for production-based subsidy, which will be described in the following 
section. 
 
Such a system would certainly solve some difficulties, but these kinds of funds have 
been considered very problematic. For example, they were thought to create a sum of 
money “without a master”, difficult to control and monitor. Also, they were simply 
considered to be against the unwritten norms and conventions of the country, and 
possibly even against the constitution. 
 
One interviewee believed that investment subsidy would require less bureaucracy than 
continuous support mechanisms like production subsidy which is paid by kWh, whereas 
some others found investment subsidy to be quite bureaucratic. Even more 
problematically, it was considered arbitrary, being solely in the control of the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry:  
 
“A: Plus that it is always the process of granting the subsidy which is rather 
bureaucratic and takes long, and there is no certainty on how the subsidies will 
develop in the future, there is always this lottery in the fall in the Parliament, 
deciding how much money will be given for the following year. […] 
Q: Well what should the investment subsidy be like then? 
A: It should be an automatic system as it used to be in Sweden. That a certain 
subsidy will be granted automatically to projects that fulfil certain requirements, 
and you know what the requirements are when you start planning a project. Now 
this Finnish system is like a black box, you’re told that you have to fulfil certain 
conditions in order to get the higher percentage subsidy, but you do not ever 
really know yourself what the conditions are.”  
 
To some extent the opposite side of predictability is flexibility: policies that are very 
predictable and stable can be quite inflexible. There were only few comments where 
flexibility was emphasised in the interviews, in general the stability and predictability of 
instruments were valued most. However, one interviewee pointed out that the use of 
investment subsidy makes it possible to direct funds to wind power projects in 
particular, as they can be given as a subsidy a higher percentage of investment costs 
than other energy projects. In particular, biomass tends to be more competitive in 
Finland, and such projects receive smaller subsidies. More automatic systems, such as 
green certificates, would treat all renewables equally.  
 
Investment subsidy was considered by some respondents to be suitable for new 
technologies, not for creating market demand. As mentioned before, it is possible to get 
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higher subsidy percentage for a project that includes new technological innovations. Of 
course, the main goal of all wind power policy is to make the policies unnecessary, by 
increasing wind power’s competitiveness in the electricity market. It can be said that 
there are two main ways of reaching this competitiveness, namely, technological 
development and economies of scale. Much of the criticism against Finnish investment 
subsidy was that it concentrates on technological development, when (according to this 
argument) creating market pull would result in learning-by-doing and economies of 
scale, lowering the costs of wind electricity more rapidly. Many critical respondents 
approved, nevertheless, the investment subsidy as a sort of special case, only to be given 
to true demonstrations of new technology, but not used as the main support instrument. 
Those who emphasise technological development were naturally pleased with the 
existing system.  
 
The significance of the problem is rather obvious here: some way must be found to 
compensate for the higher costs of wind power, if it is expected to enter the market. 
However, there was disagreement on what the most effective way of lowering costs is: 
technological development or economies of scale. If the strategy is the latter, investment 
subsidy in its current form may not be particularly relevant. It is clear that the definition 
of the problem to be solved is crucial for finding the relevant policies.  
 
Predictability was thought to be both a plus and a problem with the Finnish investment 
subsidy, as was administrative efficiency. Limited transparency of the method was 
criticised, as well as the way it leaves power to the administration (democracy in 
decision making). Sufficiency of funds was a reason to oppose the use of investment 
subsidy, at least if new methods of collecting the funds were not introduced. The 
method discussed, a fund or trust, was criticised on the grounds of incompatibility with 
the existing legislation and “the common way of the country”. 
 
4.3.3. Tax refund / Production subsidy 
 
This subsidy is based on the amount of electricity produced. It used to be the equivalent 
of electricity tax (~0.7 c/kWh) (Helynen et al., 2003), but since 2004 is no longer 
attached to the tax rate. Therefore even when the tax rate is changed, this does not 
necessarily mean changes to the subsidy, and the other way around. Obviously this 
means that it is not strictly speaking a tax refund any more, but the same arguments that 
were aimed at tax refund mostly apply to any other production-based subsidy as well. 
Some also remarked that as the tax is not collected from the producers but the 
consumers of energy, and then paid to the producers, it is misleading to call it a 
“refund”.  
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Figure 9. Probability and preferability of tax refund in 2010, according to the respondents. 
 
The main problem with tax refund (or any production-based subsidy) was thought to be 
its unpredictability. There is no guarantee that the subsidy would still be in place after 
10 or 15 years, because the political priorities may change. This obviously increases the 
investor’s risk, and was referred to as political risk. On the other hand, some considered 
this type of subsidy more predictable than the investment subsidy. This is because a 
production-based subsidy is automatic, and requires no decision-making in the Ministry. 
Removing the connection to tax rate may increase the predictability of the production-
based subsidy, as it is no longer tied to the tax systems that can change yearly.  
 
As was discussed above, the predictability and stability of policy instruments were 
considered extremely important. To some respondents it mattered little what instrument 
was used, as long as the system was stable. While all respondents understood this need, 
it was sometimes pointed out that long-term commitment to financial instruments is not 
“the way of the country”, the way things are usually done in Finland. There is a general 
reluctance to commit the state to certain policies for a long time; perhaps it is not even 
fair to tie the hands of future governments in this way. 
 
The main theme in most reasoning for or against policy instruments was compatibility 
with the free market. Some believed that tax refund would distort the market least, 
whereas others argued that a continuous form of support introduces a continuous 
distortion, more harmful than an investment subsidy which is given just once. 
 
One respondent considered also tax refund to be a command-and-control type 
mechanism. He advocated for positive methods to create voluntary purchases, not for 
mechanisms that punish some energy forms while rewarding others.  
 
“If citizens do not wish this, then the mechanism starts from the wrong end, with 
these old-fashioned control mechanisms you punish others so that you can 
support wind power, so that citizens get it [=wind electricity] for the same price 
as other electricity, you don’t […] people’s own activity, consider it good and 
promote it”  
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He also argued that this “punishing” type of policy would increase the overall costs of 
the system. To some extent the argument suits the “real” command-and-control systems 
better. After all, here it is, to a large extent, a fiscal energy tax which is being collected 
for the state, and the state simply waives its right to these funds in the case of some 
renewable forms. It is really no different from any other state subsidy, as discussed 
above.  
 
The main argument, however, that punishing some forms of energy is somehow wrong, 
is in contradiction with most respondents’ arguments. They often considered the 
internalisation of external costs to energy costs, for example, through taxation, to be the 
most effective and just way to promote renewables. This issue will be discussed in more 
detail in section 5 (Discussion). 
 
In summary, production subsidy was both supported and opposed on the grounds of 
predictability. Equally divided were views about its compatibility with the free 
market. There were some doubts about the justness of the approach. It was also 
accused of being old-fashioned and of having high costs for the economy.  
 
4.4. Command-and-control 
 
Much of the discussion on environmental policy has been about the choice of market-
based mechanisms and command-and-control type mechanisms. The former have often 
been called more cost-effective, as the market mechanisms in principle produce optimal 
resource allocation. Criticism against this reasoning has pointed out that command-and-
control mechanisms may have a higher dynamic efficiency, i.e. increase innovation (e.g. 
Driesen, 2003).  
 
Command-and-control type instruments are not currently in use in Finnish wind power 
policy. Traditionally, however, their role has been fairly large in the environmental 
policy, in particular in natural conservation and pollution control. The environmental 
policy is also moving towards new policy instruments. Ministry of Trade and Industry 
has been more positive towards deregulation in general than the Ministry of the 
Environment (Sairinen, 2003). Wind power policy, as part of energy policy, is the 
domain of the Ministry of Trade and Industry in Finland.  
 
The positive attitude toward deregulation and competition in the electricity market can 
be observed throughout the energy sector and even beyond it. In fact, there was no 
group among the respondents where market-based mechanisms and voluntary purchases 
of green electricity would not have been valued, even though there were naturally 
differences of degree among the attitudes of the respondents.   
 
Some saw a clear difference between financial incentives, and those described as 
command-and-control. Others, however, saw little difference: 
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“actually this guaranteed price or production subsidy or tax refund or green 
certificate are all the same. Just giving the electricity producer more money for 
his product. […] So in fact, I don’t think we can talk about anything else but a 
subsidy based on production, or an investment subsidy, these two.”  
 
Three command-and-control type instruments were introduced in the questionnaire. The 
first one was formulated as guaranteed price for wind electricity, and it refers to such 
systems as the German feed-in tariff. The second is a wind electricity quota, which is 
often linked to green certificates, as will be discussed later. The third suggestion was 
governmental energy companies’ obligation to build wind power. All of these 
instruments would mean a stronger deviation from normal competition than that caused 
by subsidisation.  
 
4.4.1. Guaranteed price for wind electricity 
 
A guaranteed price for wind electricity has been used, for example, in Germany. The 
tariffs there used to be connected to the market price of electricity, but since April 2000 
the tariffs have a previously set level. The tariff for new projects will be lowered by 
1.5 % yearly, in anticipation of cost reductions in the sector (Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, 2002; Twele, 2002).  
 
In the UK wind electricity tariffs were guaranteed for 15 years through the so-called 
Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO), but there was a competitive bidding process 
through which companies could enter into the system. Although there are still a number 
of old contracts running under NFFO, no new contracts are being made, and the new 
support system is based mainly on the renewable energy certificates and a quota for 
renewable energy (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2002).   
 
A guaranteed price is certainly a financial incentive to build wind power, but it has 
certain aspects which distinguish it from the instruments discussed above. First, the 
state regulates the price of wind electricity, but the electricity is being paid by 
consumers. In this way the “extra” money comes from the market (=consumers) 
directly, whereas in the previously discussed methods it comes from the state funds. The 
more fundamental difference, however, is that it is a forcing method, a mandatory rule 
to the markets, rather than an incentive to act voluntarily. Where investment subsidy 
and tax refund reduce the financial risk, a guaranteed price (and the certain market, as 
this type of policy is normally associated with the obligation to buy all produced wind 
electricity into the grid) nearly removes financial risk. The investor knows from the 
beginning that all produced electricity will be sold for a certain price. However, income 
depends naturally on wind conditions and therefore varies from year to year.  
 
Nevertheless, it is again more a question of a continuum than clearly separate 
categories. The main reason for my emphasis here is that many respondents had a very 
different view about such methods as investment subsidy and guaranteed price. The 
former was considered to be much more suited to free electricity markets than the latter, 
and thereby much more suited to Finland.  
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Figure 10. Probability and preferability of a guaranteed price for wind electricity in 2010, 
according to the respondents. 
 
The probability of the use of this method in Finland was considered very low. This was 
attributed to general dislike towards it in Finland, and even to a lack of will to develop 
methods that would really benefit wind power in Finland. There were also concerns that 
if a new method was developed for wind power, the representatives of other renewables 
would protest, unless they were also included in the new system.  
 
The views about desirability were sharply divided as can be seen in Figure 10, with 5 
respondents considering it very undesirable and 5 very desirable. 
 
The main reason to favour this instrument was its perceived effectiveness. In fact, few 
people questioned the effectiveness of this instrument. (One respondent, however, 
considered it a “short-term gimmick” that could not ensure long-term development, as 
the technology itself is not mature enough, and another implied that any forcing system 
would somehow be stopped or sabotaged by the energy sector, stating that any “stick” 
method simply does not work and “carrots” are needed instead). Many made references 
to the very fast growth of wind power in Germany under the feed-in tariff, and 
acknowledged its effectiveness in creating market activity.  
 
There were several points by which the method was criticised, however. For example, 
the guaranteed prices would require governmental commitment to a certain system for 
15 or 20 years which is largely not considered appropriate in Finland, as discussed 
above. 
 
Guaranteed price was criticised for being expensive and not cost-effective. Since the 
price is guaranteed, it was argued, there is little incentive to build wind power to 
optimal sites and to use better technology to drive down the costs. It is possible to build 
wind power also to areas where it is far from profitable without subsidisation. As the 
system does not force wind power producers to compete against one another, it does not 
drive to lower costs of the technology. This argument was repeated in the recent 
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working group paper (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2004), where the use of 
guaranteed tariffs was not recommended.  
 
It is true that the feed-in tariff enables building also to non-optimal sites. However, there 
certainly have been significant cost reductions in Germany, and the analysis by 
Klaassen et al. (2004) indicates that the cost reductions through learning have been 
specific to wind power technology, not country specific. Hemmelskamp (1999; p.85) 
discusses the German policy and argues that “in contrast to investment cost subsidies, 
the introduction of returns-dependent financial support for companies awakened 
interest in functional, economic wind farms.” He also states that “returns-dependent 
financial assistance in particular stimulated demand oriented around cost-efficiency 
and indirectly triggered the corresponding innovation from manufacturers. Every 
improvement in the performance and value for money of the equipment increased the 
subsidised component. In this way, a powerful incentive for further development of wind 
energy equipment was created” (Hemmelskamp, 1999, p.79). Certainly it makes sense, 
even with the guaranteed price, to lower production costs in order to increase profits.  
 
In addition, there were some remarks in the interviews that seemed to contradict the 
view of feed-in tariffs not having any impact on technological innovation. According to 
one respondent, the way the very large German market dominated the industry for 
several years forced the turbine manufacturers to constantly strive for bigger and bigger 
turbines, which were optimal for the German market: 
 
“instead of developing turbines that produce electricity as cheaply as possible, it 
was better to develop turbines that produce as much electricity as possible, that is 
as big ones as possible. […] because it was best for the client to buy as big a 
turbine as possible and to get as much energy from the small land area as 
possible.”  
 
If this is indeed true, it would mean that there has been significant technological 
innovation, but at the expense of cost reductions. It would help this analysis if the costs 
for more conventional, smaller turbines were distinguished from the larger turbines 
representing new innovation. 
 
A representative of the German wind power association believed that the very fast 
technological development and innovation has meant that there is not enough time for 
product optimisation: 
 
“we could have much better cost if we had one product longer in optimization, 
instead of having a new development, which is very cost-intensive, three years 
later, every two years a new development keeps the prices high, because you have 
to share the development cost in the product, and if you have a product which is 
running since five years and the development costs are depreciated, then you can 
offer it for a lower price in the market. And if you have an optimization of a 
product, you can also have cost optimization, but if there is no optimization 
anyway in the product, technically and economically, the price level stays high. 
So, I think there will be a cost reduction in the future, if the market calms down a 
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little bit, and we don’t have such short period of product development which we 
have had in the last years.”  
 
The most significant benefits from having bigger turbines will probably emerge with 
offshore wind farms, as there the costs of foundations and connections to grid (per 
turbine) are much higher than onshore. In the future it can be expected that also these 
large turbines can be optimised and their costs brought down.  
 
The question of cost reduction and technological innovation was certainly important in 
the discussion, but in the end there was an even more fundamental reason to oppose this 
policy instrument: its incompatibility with the free electricity market.  
 
The process of opening the electricity market to competition was quite lengthy, and 
some respondents considered it irrational or undesirable to now introduce methods that 
restrict competition and reintroduce state control. Some respondents, however, 
anticipated that there might be a step back towards more regulation, as, for example, the 
market does not sufficiently take into account the issue of security of supply, or long-
term planning and investing in general. 
 
Those respondents who saw the free competition as the most important feature of the 
market did not see these instruments as compatible with the market. Interestingly, some 
other respondents referred to guaranteed price and wind electricity quota as market-
based instruments, probably because they are about creating a market, not about pushing 
the technology. One respondent described these methods (or any subsidies etc.) as ways 
to create instability to the market. As the market actors respond to the changed situation, 
they increase the use of renewables and a new balance is reached.  
 
Some arguments were about particular practical difficulties with incompatibility with 
free market, such as an instrument being in conflict with EU legislation. Often, 
however, the defence of free markets was more about the “spirit” of competition. A few 
statements were philosophically or politically motivated: 
 
“I have a very positive image of people, I believe in the goodness of humankind, 
so I trust, maybe a little too much, in people’s coming to their senses […] 
environmentally good things will be seen as important and their importance will 
increase. […] So in this way very positive and in this respect individualistic […] I 
don’t believe in top-down politics very much, at this moment somehow this free, 
should I say real market economy, solutions that are based on people’s free 
choice, somehow these seem natural. And dictating things from above is far from 
this.”  
 
“Q: What about this free market is so good that we should…?  
A: Well I don’t know if there is anything (laughs) so good, but of course it will 
keep the price of electricity right, they say, and maybe it is after all a part of the 
structure of our society.”  
 
“For me, in general, talking about any form of electricity production, subsidizing 
it till the end of the world just doesn’t fit this western thinking.”  
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These type of arguments about markets and competition apply, of course, to all 
command-and-control type instruments.  
 
In summary, guaranteed tariff was considered effective, but expensive for the society. It 
was not considered acceptable for the Finnish policy system, or for free market 
conditions. Its dynamic efficiency was thought to be low. As a forcing method it was 
also criticised for being dictatorial and against western values.   
 
4.4.2. Wind electricity quota for electricity suppliers 
 
There was some confusion among the interviewees in regard to this policy instrument, 
mainly because of the way it was formulated in Finnish in the questionnaire. Even 
though the question mentioned quotas, some people seemed to interpret it as an 
obligation to buy all produced wind electricity into the grid. Such an obligation was 
considered rather ineffective, if it is not accompanied with a guaranteed (minimum) 
price. When asked whether there could be a situation where some wind electricity could 
not be sold, it was usually stated that all produced wind electricity can be sold. This 
results from wind powers low variable costs. Whether this price is enough to keep the 
company solvent is another issue (the investment cost is high).  
 
Quotas are in use at least in the UK and Sweden. In these countries the quota is for 
renewable energy, however, not specifically wind power. One way to manage this quota 
is to have green certificates and a trading system for them6. Some voluntary green 
certificate trading has already been tried in Finland7. A quota belongs to the category of 
command-and-control instruments as it introduces a certain market to renewable energy, 
which is not in competition with the conventional energy sources.  
 
                                                 
6
 There seemed to be some confusion in the interviews between having green certificates in general, and a 
system of mandatory quotas for green certificates. Green certificates on their own are not really a policy 
instrument, merely a way of separating electricity and its “greenness” i.e. environmental benefits. If these 
certificates are created under state system, it is a question of governmental labelling. 
7
 see e.g. GreenStreamNetwork, http://www.gsn-trade.com/index_comp.htm 
 27
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
v.
im
pr
o
ba
bl
e
/u
n
de
si
ra
bl
e
ra
th
er
 
im
pr
.
 
/
u
n
de
si
ra
bl
e
pr
o
b.
50
%
/in
di
ffe
re
n
ce
ra
th
er
 
pr
o
b.
 
/
de
si
ra
bl
e
v.
 
pr
o
ba
bl
e 
/
de
si
ra
bl
e
n
u
m
be
r 
o
f a
n
s
w
e
rs
probability
preferability
 
 
Figure 11. Probability and preferability of a wind electricity quota for electricity suppliers in 
2010, according to the respondents. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 11, the probability of this instrument was thought to be low, 
and the views about its desirability are polarised, much like those about guaranteed 
price. Also similarly to the previous instrument, a wind electricity quota set for 
electricity suppliers was usually considered effective in reaching the target, in part 
because it does not depend on consumer choices. One respondent remarked that this 
type of policy instrument would not require as much state funds as many other 
instruments. 
 
However, despite the benefits, a quota was not always approved of. The main objection 
was this instrument’s incompatibility with free markets and existing legislation. The 
same wish to distort markets as little as possible and the belief in benefits of 
competition that were discussed with previous instruments were brought up here as 
well. Sometimes it was remarked that voluntary purchases would be ideal, but if they do 
not take place, the state has to interfere. These interferences can be dictatorial or cause 
market distortions, but they may turn out to be necessary for public good: 
 
“People don’t think what is green and what is not, no. It is money that talks. […] 
The society has to say that this is the way we want it. Whether it is the green 
certificate or emission trading or this quota, which seems a little dictatorial, but 
apparently we have to. If we want to live in a pleasant environment, then we have 
to agree in the society that darn it, this is how we will do it now.”  
 
In addition to more general views, there were some specific arguments about the 
practical application of this instrument. It was argued that if the system was based on 
some sort of renewable energy certificate trading, wind power would not benefit, as it 
would lose in the competition to the more affordable biomass, as well as to imported 
wind electricity from very windy sites, for example.  
 
Sweden has recently introduced a quota system where all renewables are treated 
equally, and one respondent remarked that the high proportion of hydropower in the 
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Swedish electricity market, combined with the yearly variances in precipitation, cause 
instability to the price of certificates. This can cause problems to wind power as well. It 
might be necessary to create separate quotas for different renewables, if the target is to 
increase wind power capacity. Another interviewee was reluctant to bind the electricity 
sector with wind power quotas, as wind power production also changes yearly as a 
result of variations in the amount of wind. 
 
One respondent considered green certificates problematic for energy companies, which 
already have to deal with rather complicated electricity trading, carbon emission permit 
trading, etc. Another remarked that big producers might be able to dominate the market 
and control the price of green certificates. 
 
Quotas were considered effective, but possibly incompatible with the free market and 
dictatorial. Low administrative efficiency was expected, as there would be a need for 
careful planning if the system was to benefit wind power, and transaction costs to 
companies were thought to be high.  
 
4.4.3. State-owned energy companies’ obligation to build wind power 
 
I introduced this policy instrument to the questionnaire in the hope that it would inspire 
the respondents to look for new, perhaps radical instruments. I did not believe myself 
that such a method would ever be taken to use. None of the interviewees considered its 
use probable in 2010, however, one respondent considered the use of this method 
“rather probable” in 2025, without mentioning reasons. 
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Figure 12. Probability and preferability of state-owned companies’ obligation to build wind 
power in 2010, according to the respondents. 
 
There were a few respondents who considered state-owned companies’ obligation to 
build wind power preferable, but mostly it was considered undesirable. The reason was 
that this was thought to be quite unsuitable for market environment. As long as state-
owned companies compete in the same field as privately owned ones, it was not thought 
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to be right or even legally possible to put them in a different position from their 
competitors. The fact that the stock of state-owned companies such as Fortum are also 
traded in the exchange was significant, as forcing a company to build wind power could 
lower the value of the company. These reasons explained also the improbability of the 
instrument. 
 
One respondent believed, however, that state-owned companies could easily be ordered 
to build more wind power, although he suggested that the state would buy all the 
produced wind electricity, lessening the company’s financial risk. He believed that if an 
energy company is owned by the state, it would have less trouble negotiating with state 
officials, such as the Ministry of the Environment for land use planning, etc. In his 
opinion this method would increase the wind power capacity in Finland very 
effectively. 
 
Main criteria that emerged with this instrument were effectiveness and incompatibility 
with existing legislation and market environment. 
 
4.5. Other methods 
 
Some interviewees came up with instruments that were not mentioned in the 
questionnaire. These will be given a brief overview here.  
  
Some activities could be classified as information guidance. The most important of 
them was not directed (only) towards market actors, but towards government itself: the 
land use planning (i.e. zoning) practices and existing plans have not taken the needs of 
wind power much into account, which has delayed wind power construction noticeably. 
In Finland it is the Ministry of the Environment that is responsible for zoning 
guidelines, and it has responded to the problem by, for example, setting up a working 
group to study the requisites for building wind-power plants under Finnish 
environmental legislation (Ministry of the Environment, 2002). In addition to the 
authorities, this type of work was also hoped to help companies planning to build wind 
power, as they would have a better idea what to expect from the process, and what 
environmental aspects to take into account.  
 
According to some respondents, the environmental authorities’ lack of experience with 
wind power projects has also been a delaying factor. Educating officials on wind power 
was seen as a way to solve this problem.  
 
Another field of information production that the state was hoped to take part in (or pay 
for) is the compilation of wind data. Existing data has been collected mainly for lower 
heights (~50 m), and as new turbines are much taller than this, reaching faster wind 
speeds, this data is not very useful for planning further wind power projects.  
 
It was also suggested that the state and other public bodies, such as municipalities, 
should purchase green electricity for their consumption. This would not only create 
markets, but would also set a good example, and inspire other consumers.  
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It was also thought possible to auction subsidised wind power contracts, perhaps in the 
way it was done under the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation in the UK. One interviewee 
criticised this system for granting contracts only to those who have access to the 
windiest, most profitable sites, leaving all others without any subsidisation. It has also 
been argued that this has pushed the British turbines to windy but environmentally 
sensitive areas, which has increased local resistance to wind power (Hemmelskamp, 
1999; Klaassen et al., 2004). 
 
There has been much discussion about new policy instruments within the environmental 
sector. One of the topics has been voluntary agreements (e.g. Sairinen, 2003). All wind 
power investments are (at least up to now) voluntary and the above-mentioned auctions 
might be the only mechanism that would introduce agreements between state and 
companies to wind power policy. The agreements would be binding, however, and more 
in the nature of a normal contract, so the definition does not perfectly apply.  
 
Another use for the green certificates was to use them to reach targets in (carbon 
dioxide) emission reductions instead of targets in percentage of renewable energy. It 
could be seen that this would increase the technological flexibility of the emission 
reduction systems.  
 
Other suggested policy instruments were the requirement that all municipalities would 
name sites for wind power production, that the bureaucratic process of getting building 
permits was speeded up, and that renewables were prioritised when there is oversupply 
of electricity to the grid.  
 
It was also suggested that subsidies could be directed to earlier projects, for example it 
could be announced that the subsidy would be “X” up to year 2006 or up to 200 MW of 
installed capacity, and “X-Y” after that. This might encourage companies to take early 
action, as they would know about the changes in advance. This suggestion refers very 
clearly to the question of predictability as well.  
 
All in all, there seemed to be a number of ideas and suggestions that could be used for 
wind power policy. These different methods were supported mainly on the grounds of 
significance and relevance. There was also a call for a more vague virtue of 
innovativeness in energy policy instruments. In this respect, and considering the slow 
growth of capacity in Finland, it is unfortunate that there does not seem to be plans to 
introduce any new methods in the near future (see Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
2004) 
 
 
5. Discussion  
 
Before discussing the findings of my study, I would like to point out one feature of the 
method and discuss its significance.  
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In this paper I have preserved the anonymity of the respondents. I have not referred to 
their answers even through a category, such as “a representative of the administration”. 
There were two reasons for this. Firstly, sometimes the respondents represented more 
than one group, for example, some researchers participate also in the activities of the 
lobbying group Finnish Wind Power Association. Secondly, answers could be quite 
different even among representatives of a single group. Responses could not be deduced 
on the basis of the organisation the interviewee worked in. Therefore a statement by one 
representative of a group does not necessarily reflect the views of the other 
representatives. Using any kind of identifying label could not only jeopardize their 
anonymity but also possibly give a wrong impression about the groups to the reader.  
 
I believe that the unexpectedness of some answers tells us two things: First, the goal of 
the anonymity was reached, as the interviewees were able to give their honest views that 
might be slightly different than those of their organisations. Second, wind power policy 
may be such a new issue in Finland that there has not been time for the opinions to 
become entrenched.  
 
5.1. Defining wind power policy 
 
What is wind power policy? In this study it was defined as governmental wind power 
programs and policy instruments, such as the setting of national wind power capacity 
targets and the use of the investment subsidy. During the interviews it became clear that 
this definition leaves some important areas out of the discussion. First, the issues related 
to siting wind turbines were not addressed, as these are not part of energy policy. Siting 
and permit problems turned out to be one of the reasons why the growth of the installed 
capacity has been slow, however, in spite of the existing wind power policy.  
 
It is not only a question of local resistance, even though this has been encountered in 
many projects, but also a question of unclear regulations. In addition, existing land use 
plans do not normally take wind power into account, as they have been designed before 
the issue was actual. Some work has been done to overcome these problems, but siting 
can be expected to remain an important topic in wind power development. One of the 
main challenges will be the integration of local people into the wind power 
development, seeing them as a valuable resource and stakeholder group instead of a 
difficult opposition (see Varho, 2003).  
 
Another crucial aspect of wind power policy are the actions directed towards other 
energy forms which indirectly affect wind power’s competitiveness in the market. 
Perhaps the most effective, and to many interviewees the most just way of promoting 
wind power would be the internalisation of external costs of competing energy forms, 
for example through a sufficiently high CO2 tax. This aspect was not discussed in the 
questionnaire, but it emerged often in the interviews.  
 
One respondent argued that the Finnish electricity tax is an attempt to internalise the 
external costs, and obviously such energy forms that do not cause these external costs 
should be exempted. Therefore calling the tax refund a subsidy is misleading: you’re 
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simply not taxing something that is not there. Whether the Finnish electricity tax in 
reality has a directive function or is simply a fiscal tax cannot be discussed here. 
 
The importance of such measures as CO2-taxes or emission permits to support wind 
power has been established by Hadley and Short (2001), for example, and in the recent 
study of Finnish energy sector by Honkatukia et al. (2003). These instruments can be 
expected to have a significant importance, even though there is yet little information on 
how much, for example, the European Union carbon trading will affect the situation.  It 
is likely, however, that also policies directed specifically to the renewable energy forms 
will be needed. Internalising the externalities does not address many of the barriers 
mentioned in this study, such as informational deficiencies.  
 
5.2. Objectives of the policy  
 
The objectives of the Finnish wind power policy have not been very clearly stated 
anywhere. There is the official target: 500 MW of installed capacity by the year 2010, 
and the “vision” of 2000 MW by the year 2025 (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2003). 
However, increasing the capacity is only one of the existing objectives.  
 
One of the reasons for promoting wind power production is the reduction of CO2 
emissions from the Finnish energy sector. The impact of subsidies on emissions has 
been very limited so far, as was recently reported by the State Audit Office (VTV, 
2003). It is not quite fair to consider only the reductions that result directly from these 
subsidised projects, however, as they are part of the process of creating knowledge and 
expertise that can benefit also future wind power projects. Indirect benefits can be 
obtained through emission reductions from new projects in the future.  
 
In the 1993 plan to promote wind power production in Finland (Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, 1993) there is a mention of the objective of supporting Finnish wind turbine 
industry and its export activities. In subsequent programs this has not been mentioned 
(VTV, 2003). The reason for this might be the restrictions the European Union places 
on subsidising business activities. There is no doubt, however, that the motive of 
supporting Finnish industry, and thereby creating economic and employment benefits, is 
very real and present in the minds of the respondents. This motive was found in all 
respondent groups (see Varho, 2003). 
 
Perhaps the most important objective is to make wind power competitive in the long 
run. Even if this is not clearly stated in official documents, it was very obvious to all 
interviewees. It was said that subsidies are necessary in order to make wind power 
competitive, but that the aim of subsidies has to be to make themselves unnecessary in 
the future. The disagreement was not over this overall goal, but over how it could best 
be attained.  
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5.2.1. Dynamic efficiency 
 
It is the criterion “dynamic efficiency” that best corresponds with the ability of the 
policy instruments to make wind power competitive by lowering its costs. The two main 
routes to competitiveness can be defined as market pull and technology push. They 
represent two different components of learning; learning-by-doing, and economies of 
scale result from market pull, and learning-by-searching and technological development 
result from technology push.  
 
When asked about the ways wind power costs will be brought down, both technological 
innovation and economies of scale were mentioned. Economies of scale referred to 
increasing turbine size, increasing  project size, and mass production of turbines. Some 
interviewees also referred to the improving know-how in the companies. The dominant 
view in the wind power policy, however, seemed to be that it is through research and 
constant technological inventions that the competitiveness can be reached. Therefore 
R&D funding was considered very preferable. In addition, as discussed before, Finnish 
investment subsidy is directed to projects that include some new innovation.  
 
Several interviewees emphasised the need to create market pull which would result in 
economies of scale and learning-by-doing. There were conflicting views on who would 
create the market pull; the household consumers, the industrial or public consumers, or 
the public authorities. Some references to the economies of scale and learning-by-doing 
seemed to assume that this development would take place without state interference. It 
has been argued, however, that on their own the markets are unlikely to produce this 
development, and that judicious government activity and co-operation with market 
actors is needed (IEA, 2003). After all, before the product is commercially competitive, 
it makes most sense to all actors to wait for others to be the first movers. Even in 
Finland it has been suggested that Finns should wait until the costs have been brought 
down, before investing into wind power. Internationally it may be possible to wait for 
other countries to subsidise wind power and therefore bring the costs of technology 
down, but national market, company know-how, operation and maintenance network, 
land use planning practices, etc. have to be adapted and developed in individual 
countries. These are unlikely to happen without governmental initiatives. If, however, 
only the costs of technology are seen as the barrier, sufficient action may not be taken.   
 
Consumer demand would obviously create market pull. The way it was discussed, 
however, did not address the impact this would have on further costs, it was its other 
benefits that were discussed: voluntariness, acceptability in the market environment, and 
that it would not require either state funds or state bureaucracy.  
 
Based on mathematical analysis of economic policy, Tinbergen (1952) came to the 
conclusion that there should be (at least) as many policy instruments as there are targets 
for policy, in order to reach the goals. This has been called Tinbergen’s rule. Regardless 
of whether the rule always applies to policy, it is a useful starting point for the 
discussion. As noted, there are various targets for Finnish wind power policy. In 
addition, there are several policy instruments in use but they are not necessarily directed 
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at different targets. In particular, the investment subsidy in Finland has more than one 
goal: One is to lower the costs of technology, by forcing innovation, another is to 
increase the installed capacity. Since the growth of capacity has been slow, it seems that 
this approach has not been optimal.  
 
In light of the views presented in the interviews, it must be assumed that R&D funding 
will continue in Finland. The policies could also include more effective volume 
generating instruments, leading to learning-by-doing. The optimal allocation of funds 
for different policy instruments could be studied using the two factor learning curves 
(2FLC), which incorporate both types of learning (see Klaassen et al., 2004). 
 
5.3. Criteria 
 
Considering the type of material the analysis is based on, it is obvious that the emerging 
criteria is not only “legal” in nature. In fact, both more process oriented “legal” criteria 
and more political, value-based criteria were brought up. The latter includes justness, 
voluntariness, and “western values” as intrinsic values. For example, information 
guidance was often valued indirectly for encouraging voluntary, responsible, individual, 
and market-based action. Voluntary purchases by environmentally concerned citizens 
were even seen as most fair (if, and only if, someone wants wind power, he or she 
should pay for it).  
 
Significance and relevance were strong criteria. As these relate to the effectiveness of 
instruments in reaching the overall goals, it can be seen that effectiveness was one of the 
most fundamental criteria. This is hardly surprising. Efficiency was quite important as 
well. Dynamic efficiency was discussed often, even though the term dynamic efficiency 
was not used. Administrative efficiency was mentioned a few times, although the 
strongest comments referred to building permits and siting, which were outside the 
scope of this paper.  
 
The interviewees were quite concerned with cost-effectiveness. There was a wish to use 
scarce state resources as efficiently as possible. The respondents also worried about the 
sufficiency of funds. A new way of collecting money for actual support instruments was 
suggested. Some criticism against the use of specific instruments was that there would 
not be enough funds available for them. Perhaps this insufficiency of funds could be 
called a regulation criterion, but it did not influence the respondents’ choice of policy 
instruments as much as the way an instrument could be used, its volume.  
 
Flexibility in any of its forms was mentioned only a few times, external and 
technological flexibility almost not at all. The counterparts of flexibility, predictability 
and stability, on the other hand, received a great deal of attention. Flexibility was used 
mainly as the explanation why long-term commitments are not acceptable in Finland, 
but this seems to be a rather strong argument.  
 
The energy production sector prefers knowing what the policies will be like. One 
respondent even said that it would make little difference what form the subsidies would 
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take, as long as they could be relied upon. There was little faith in the continuation of 
the policies, however, so that the projects always include some “political risk”. Clearly 
the administration prefers flexibility, the industry stability, but there is some question 
about which instruments are predictable and which are not (in particular investment 
subsidy vs. production subsidy). 
 
Here it could be pointed out that the whole wind power policy is based on set targets. 
These, in particular the target of 500 MW of installed capacity by the year 2010, are 
seen to be very significant (see Varho and Tapio, 2004). It was often assumed that since 
the state is committed to this target, it would somehow find means of reaching it (even 
if the means were unreasonable, some interviewees feared). Interestingly this target was 
considered to bind also future governments, whereas commitment to particular policy 
instruments cannot be expected.   
 
Some criteria emerged from outside of the regulation theory discussion and may be 
rather specific to wind power policy. The most important of these was the compatibility 
of instruments with existing legislation and in particular with the liberalised electricity 
market.  
 
5.3.1. Compatibility with other legislation and market environment  
 
Legislation should obviously be consistent, so compatibility with other legislation is a 
natural criterion. However, here it did not only refer to impossibilities, such as an 
instrument being unconstitutional, but also to more vague barriers. “Not the way things 
are done in Finland” is not a very specific criterion, but it is a strong one. In models of 
policy analysis “nation's policy culture and policy style” (Linder and Peters, 1989) and 
“political and institutional framework conditions” (Jänicke, 1997) have been found to 
be important in determining the policy instrument choice. Sometimes, of course, a 
government may decide to make an exception, if the issue is significant enough (see 
DTI, 2000; 9).  
 
The existence of liberalised, deregulated markets also places certain boundaries. The 
acceptability of policy options to these conditions emerges as one of the main criteria 
for wind power policy in Finland. This reflects the debate of command-and-control 
regulations vs. market-based regulations, so prevalent in environmental regulation 
discourse.  
 
Jänicke (1997) mentions “strategy” as another factor influencing policy instrument 
choice. By this term he refers to the general long-term approach to the problem under 
regulation. For the past decade or so, the most significant strategy that relates to 
electricity policy has been the deregulation and liberalisation of the market. There was a 
feeling among many respondents that the liberalisation was a long and difficult process, 
and going against this strategy now, for something as relatively insignificant as wind 
power is in Finland, would be difficult or even a little absurd. 
 
Since one of the reasons for the deregulation was to increase efficiency and competition, 
it is not surprising that any interference with the market, in particular such strong 
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methods as guaranteed price, are seen as problematic. However, it is perhaps unjust to 
blame the liberalisation process as such, since according to Pineau and Hämäläinen 
(2000) the Finnish market was exceptionally “free” even before the deregulation of the 
1990s. Competition is not something new in the market, but rather, to a large extent, the 
way the Finnish market has always operated. There were changes, nevertheless, one of 
which was that the consumers were able to freely choose their supplier. This was a 
significant change, which is reflected in the way consumers’ choice was emphasised in 
the interviews.  
 
An interesting question, worthy of further study, is whether the claims and arguments 
presented here can be proven right or wrong. For example, the research on learning 
curves tries to answer the question of how policies and trends foster innovation. The 
real impact of policies on innovation in Finland and in other countries should be studied 
further. Another example would be the way some instruments are in conflict with the 
free market; is it just the spirit of free competition that is being violated, or are there 
legal or economic problems?  
 
The spirit is certainly important on its own. There were some quite liberalistic 
tendencies in the interviews, where the benefits of free competition and minimal state 
interference were pointed to. Finding out conclusively what kind of policy is optimal is 
obviously impossible, since different economic and political schools of thought have not 
been able to resolve the issue in hundreds of years of study. More limited and practical 
issues could perhaps be solved, however, for example, whether the investment subsidy 
really interferes less with the market than other suggested instruments, as was claimed. 
 
It must be remembered, however, that there may be different reasons to emphasise 
certain criteria. For example, financial incentives are likely to be cheaper to the energy 
sector than command-and-control regulation. Voluntary purchases by households, in 
their turn, would be easiest and cheapest to the state, and emphasising the importance of 
(voluntary) demand moves the responsibility of the structural change in the electricity 
sector to the consumers. Therefore, the emphasis on consumer demand and limited state 
interference do not necessarily represent only “pure” ideas of best policy, but also 
normal (financial) interests of a group. Nevertheless, I believe that there was also honest 
trust in the benefits of free competition, and genuine belief that consumers should direct 
the wind power development by their preferences. The Finnish actors are not alone in 
this thinking, on the contrary the International Energy Agency describes the approach 
“which favours minimal interference by governments in the operation of markets” as 
“the current political ethos” (IEA, 2003; p.16).  
 
5.4. Will there be change? 
 
As can be seen from the results presented in this paper, there are very conflicting views 
about the policy instruments. These different views are problematic for the policy 
makers, as there is not even a uniform view within the energy sector that receives the 
subsidies. Guaranteed price and other command-and-control methods are so unpopular, 
however, that it does not seem likely that they would be introduced to Finland. 
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There seems to be little enthusiasm to try new methods, in particular at the same time as 
such changes as carbon emission trading are starting. This is evident in the working 
group report (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2004) where no changes to the existing 
system were proposed. One respondent also stated that Finland already has a lot of 
renewable energy production and there is therefore not as much need for strong 
measures as there is in countries with little renewable energy production.  
 
It is perhaps not so much a question of reluctance to support wind power, but rather a 
reluctance to mess up the existing system which is up and running, in particular in the 
uncertain situation of emission trading. Also, any methods that raise the price of energy 
in Finland are often considered problematic, because they might jeopardize the 
competitiveness of the Finnish energy intensive export industries.  
 
However, there are pressures to change the policy. Different policies in different 
countries, in particular if they are part of the same electricity market, are bound to cause 
problems. This is very actual now that Sweden has completely remodelled her 
renewable energy policy. Harmonisation efforts are undertaken also within the 
European Union. There are no perfect policy instruments, and no matter how the 
policies change, they will require careful design and learning from results of other 
countries.  
 
 
6. Summary 
 
In this paper I have presented and analysed views on wind power policy options 
expressed by Finnish actors in the wind power policy field. The empirical material was 
collected through interviews and a questionnaire. The views and arguments were 
discussed in relation to the criteria for good regulation, drawn from literature on 
regulation theory.  
 
The objectives of the Finnish wind power policy are not very clearly stated, although 
increasing wind power’s competitiveness seems paramount. There is no uniform view 
of the way competitiveness could be reached. The arguments used in the discourse 
contain many elements from the regulation criteria, as well as political and value-based 
criteria. Emphasis on free competition in the liberalised electricity market is strong, and 
it sets boundaries to methods that are considered appropriate for promoting wind power 
in Finland.  
 
In summary, information guidance instruments were considered fairly probable, and 
quite preferable, particularly information to consumers. Some respondents put much 
emphasis on the importance of consumer demand for the growth of the sector. However, 
these instruments were not expected to be particularly effective, and evoked rather little 
enthusiasm for or against.  
 
Financial incentives were considered very probable and rather preferable as well. 
Criticism against them was more detailed, perhaps because there is more experience on 
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these instruments in Finland. They were deemed necessary for the competitiveness of 
wind power, but should be phased out as soon as possible (with the exception of R&D 
support). Unpredictability of support was thought to be one of the main problems, 
making it more difficult to invest in wind power.  
 
Command-and-control mechanisms were considered rather improbable, and the views 
about their preferability were sharply divided. They were criticised for not being 
suitable for liberalised electricity markets, and for having limited impact on 
technological innovation.  
 
Changes to the existing policy system are expected to be slow, but pressures exist for 
harmonisation on the European level or at least in the countries participating in the 
Nordic electricity market. 
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Appendix 1 
 
List of interviewees. 
 
Name    Organisation  
 
Mika Anttonen   Ministry of Trade and Industry 
Esa Holttinen    Electrowatt-Ekono (consultant) 
Hannele Holttinen   Technical Research Centre of Finland 
Veli-Matti Jääskeläinen  WinWinD (turbine manufacturer) 
Jorma Keva    Ministry of the Environment 
Aarne Koutaniemi   Lumituuli Ltd. (a small wind power producer) 
Simo Kyllönen   Finnish Association for Nature Conservation 
Jerri Laine    TEKES, Technology Development Centre of Finland 
Ari Lampinen    University of Jyväskylä 
Peter Lund    Helsinki University of Technology 
Folke Malmgren   Vindkraftföreningen (wind power association) 
Timo Mäki   Hyötytuuli (producer of wind electricity) 
Bernt Nordman   Natur och Miljö (a nature and environment association) 
Jaakko Ojala    Ministry of the Environment 
Mauno Oksanen   Vapo Oy Energia (medium-size producer of wind electricity) 
Leo Parkkonen    Ministry of Treasury 
Esa Peltola    Technical Research Centre of Finland 
Jouni Punnonen   The Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers 
Gustav Tallqvist   Oy Synoptia Ab (agent of BONUS Energy turbines in Finland) 
Bengt Tammelin   Finnish Wind Power Association 
Martti Tiuri    Member of Parliament, chairman of the committee for the 
future (2002) 
Pentti Tiusanen   Member of Parliament, chairman of the environment  
committee 
Harry Viheriävaara   Finergy, Finnish Energy Industries Federation 
Sirkka Vilkamo   Ministry of Trade and Industry 
Jyrki Virtanen    Metso Drives Oy (producer of turbine components) 
 
Interviewed abroad 
 
Jochen Twele  Bundesverband WindEnergie e.V. (German wind power 
association) 
 
 
 
 
